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Abstract
Thi6 paper uses a recent model on ticket pricing with the aim of 
studying how the population of potential buyers is partitioned when 
there are two ranked qualities on offer. Our exercise incorporates 
specific distributions of tastes in the computation of the first order 
conditions for price selection. The role of the capacity constraints 
is also analysed and made endogenous.
'This paper is based on part o f my Ph D. dissertation at the European University 
Institute o f Florence. 1 would like to thank Louis Phlips for useful comments and 
suggestions. All errors are mine. Correspondence to: Anna Pettini, Dipartimento di 
Studi sullo Stato, via S. Caterina d ’Alessandria, 3. 1-50129 Florence. Italy, ph: 39 55 
4622923; fax: 39 55 472102; e-mail: pettini@icc8p6.8cpol.unifi.it.






















































































































































































The provision of quality by a discriminating monopolist is commonly stud­
ied under the assumption that the monopolist sells different varieties of a 
private good to people with homogeneous tastes but different reserration 
prices. In other words, customers are assumed to rank different varieties 
of a given good in the same way, but have different willingness to pay 
due to the differences in their incomes (and, thus, their ability to pay). 
The analysis of price and quality discrimination, typically relegated to the 
case of natural monopolies or public utilities, usually assumes that the 
production capacity and the number of customers are given.
In a recent paper on ticket pricing, Rosen and Rosenfield [3] (hereafter 
R-R) use the theory of second degree price discrimination to analyse some 
commonly observed ticket pricing policies under conditions of determin­
istic demand. They stress that price discrimination tends to be observed 
in activities where capacity constraints makes the marginal cost of pro­
vision smaller than the average cost and, for this reason, is also common 
in highly competitive businesses like hotels, airlines, restaurants and so 
on, and show how the relative variance of customers’ valuations bet ween 
service classes affects the degree of discrimination. One of the interesting 
features of their analysis is the derivation of the revenue maximising gap 
between the prices of two qualities on sale. Under the assumption that 
tastes are ordered, they find the marginal conditions for the derivation 
of the optimal price gap and the price for the lower quality and indicate 
how the variables can be derived recursively. Explicit formulas for the key 
variables, however, cannot be derived without specifying the functional 
form of the distribution of tastes.
The aim of this paper is to study how an heterogeneous population 
of potential buyers is partitioned when there are two qualities on offer, 
and what is the role played by the distribution of buyers’ tastes in the 
resulting pricing scheme.
Our first purpose is to characterise the properties of the revenue 
maximising gap between prices for given distribution of tastes over the 



























































































t>etween prices of low and high quality sendee. To this purpose, we use 
the formal analogy between the peak-load pricing problem and the supply 
of quality discriminated services.
I'he paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the reference 
model. Section 3 discusses the nature of the first order conditions, the 
role played by the capacity constraints and presents the equations charac­
terising the optimal price gap and the optimal price for the lower quality 
for two distributions of tastes (the details of the derivation of our results 
are given in the first two appendixes) . Section 4 presents the results of 
some numerical simulat ions of the model.
2. Reference model
R-R analyse the problem of pricing discrete classes of services such as first 
and second class seats on trains or airplanes. When price discrimination 
is applied to quality discrimination, prices are used to sort and select 
customers on the basis of their tastes. This section sketches the basic 
model by R-R. The solution for the one-factor representation of tastes is 
derived in detail, since it is the basis of our analysis.
A revenue maximising firm offers a good or a service whose charac­
teristics allow for price discrimination. The firm has to set the prices of 
the different service classes in order to get the desired number of customers 
for each class, given a capacity constraint.
The good can be sold at two given qualit ies, high (H) and low (L). All 
customers are assumed to rank different qualities in the same order, but 
their willingness to pay for each quality is not the same since it depends on 
the intensity of demand that individuals have for each quality. Individual 
preferences are completely described by the reservation prices attached to 
the two qualities: rH and rL. The choice between quality II or L is taken 
according to




























































































where pH and p; are the prices of quahties H and L. Reserve prices for 
each quality depend on the intensity of demand (T) that each customer 
has for a given quality, as in
rj  = + !3jT (2.2)
with j  =  L, H, and a,, 0j  are fixed parameters and is strictly positive. 
Solving for T, prices are distributed over a positively sloped line in the 
(th T l.) plane:
(Pltl +  <*l0 h ~  0 Hrl  ~  a H0L =  0).
The intensity of demand T  has a cumulative distribution, G  (T) =  
Jo 9 (0 dt with G  (oo) =  N,  where N is the number of people nut h positive 
taste for either type of service. The demand functions are derived by 
calculating the cut off points (TqT\) separating customers who choose / /  
from those choosing L. To and T\ obey
T0 . {
rL =  PL
rL — a L +  ®lT
(2.3)
rp . ( rH-pH =  rL -  Pi
1 1 0 LrL +  QL0H ~ 0HrL ~ nH0L =  0
so that
(2.4)
T0 =  
Ti =
Pi -  a,
0i
(Ph ~ P i ) - ( « / / -  at) (2.5a)
v (0H ~ 0,)
Demands for the two qualities depend on Ph ,Pl and Ap (pi, — pi) since
Nh = N -  G (Tt) and NL = G ( T i ) - G  (T0) . (2.0)
The objective o f the firm is to maximise total revenues: 
max (pHNH + P lNl )
= max (pH (N - G  (Tt)) +  p, (G (7',) -  G (71)))
=  max ((pH - P l) (N  - G  (Ti)) + Pl (N -  G (T„)))




























































































where G  (Tj) depends on Ap and G (To) on p/.. Given Nh <  A'// and 




0 ^  \p h Nh +PLA:t] = 
[A p ( N - G ( T , ) ) + P t  (Ar -  G  (T0)))
which is, since gfj, [Ap (N -  G (T, ))) h  ^  [ApA'H],
Nh +  Ap dNH
dAp > (=)0. (2.7)
which holds as an inequality(equality) if the capacity constraint is binding 
(not binding) (i.e. if A’h =  (< ) N h). With a similar reasoning, the first 
order conditions for pi  :
-£ - \p L ( N - G ( T 0))]
OpL
\PL ( N h  +  N l )) =
(Nh +  Nl ) +  pL
0 (Nh +  N i)  
dpL
= (NH +  NL) + p i
0 ( N - N 0) 
dpL
give us
(N „  +  NL) +  P r--(A^  N l) =  (Nh +  NL) + p i -  (N  A'o)
dpL dpL
( N „ + N L) - p i - ^  > (=)0 (2.8)
Nl =  (< )N L,






























































































Equation (2.7) alone determines the gap between prices, Ap, and the 
whole problem can be solved recursively. Exogenous paramet ers are t hose 
of tastes and the capacity available. Expiation (2.7), however, depends on 
exogenous parameters only implicitly, and no general statement on the 
optimal solution can be given without specifying the distribution function 
of the taste parameter. In addition, both equation (2.7) and (2.8) are 
transcendental functions and, therefore, not analytically solvable: they 
can only be solved numerically. Since Ap is the key variable to be found 
by the firm, we first address the problem of how to solve equation (2.7) 
with respect to Ap.
The capacity constraints play an important and under explored role.If 
the available capacity of high quality service is slack (i.e. eq.(2.7) holds 
with equality), the solution for Apfrom (2.7) is the first input of the al­
gorithm . In this first case, the seller can find the maximum number of II 
type buyers and evaluate the excess of the capacity he has for service II.
If, alternatively, the capacity constraint is binding (eq.(2.7) holds 
with inequality), optimal Ap is the result of the recursion. This second 
case enables the comparison o f the capacity constraint with the maximum 
number of people ready to buy II and determines the number of II type 
buyers rationed.1
4. Numerical solutions
The recursion requires Ap as the first input. Given An, A/I and the 
parameters of the distribution of tastes, Ap solves Tj . IVom T) , G (1\) 
(=  A'o +  A'r ) can be calculated, and (consequently) A // . Define 7 ns the 
proport ion of customers which can be served wit h t he available capacity. If 
A «  > 7A , G  (7 i) has to equal 7 A , so that T\ and Ap have to be adjusted 
accordingly. The same applies to pi.
In solving the problem numerically, we have assumed the following.





























































































(*// > a L (A a  > 0): a higher r(/ is also due to a higher <<;/. 
Assumption 2.
/)„  > 0L . Customers with a higher reservation price for each quality 
have a greater ’’ factor loading” parameter. This assumption forces the 
direction of the recursion.
Assumption 3.
Pi — 1. The price of the low quality service is normalised to one. 
This assumption facilitates the interpretation of A p as tin percentage in­
crease from the low-quality to the high-quality price. This assumption 
poses some restrictions on a t  and f)L ( 0 < Q/, < 1 and 0 L >  0 because 
of eq. (2.5a)) and forces the recursion towards Ni,  while making interpre­
tation easier. This assumption is not restrictive in any sense, and it will 
be omitted later in the analysis.
Assumption 4.
g (t) ~  A'(/i, <72). The variable t ( ‘taste’ for the good, or intensity 
of demand) is normally distributed. The reason for starting with this 
distribution is its generality, since the normal distribution is the limit 
distribution of many others . Because Ap is in the upper bound of the 
integral in (4.1), the normally distributed g(.) allows for the use of a special 
function, the ‘error function’, particularly useful for our purpose, as it can 
be seen in the derivation of the numerically solvable equation in Appendix 
1.
The use of the normal distribution, defined also for negative values of 
the taste parameter, required a further assumption to avoid the possibility 
of assigning negative taste to a part of the potential buyers. In order to 
make the negative values negligible, we assumed a variance of the taste 
parameter smaller than the average of the parameter.
4.1. Analysis




























































































a _  _  (  N „  \ =  (  Ar -  G(Ti) \ 
P \dNH/dApJ \d (N  -  G(Ti)) /dAp)  
N - £ ' g ( t ) d t
Take equation (4.1). In order to find Ap we have to solve
which is
where
N  -  J„r' g(t)dt
Ap + ------ ,  Jo r  ------r  = 0
é i ( N - f ? a W )
( Ap-Aa \Jo "  9(t )dt)
Ap =  -
_a_ÔA p (
Ap-Aq \
N — Jo 9(t)dt)
sW = ^ k exp( ( 4 (t- ^ ) i ) -





if assumption 4bis holds. Under assumptions 1 , 2 and 4 we can show that
Proposition 4.1. The transcendental implicit function to be numerically 
solved for Ap is
/((**** )-»■ » \
N - l  /  exP (~ j*J) d :  j  ^ j - N
A p ----------- ' --------- ---------------------------- / -----------  =  0 (4.4)
; * s ^ exp ( ( ^ s r s ) - ' i )
where the function to be integrated is a standardised normal distribution. 




























































































factor A' multiplying the denominator and the second term of the numer­
ator is a normalising factor: the area described by the integral is related 
to the probability that a certain group of people will be served with the 
high quality service. It is therefore a number between zero and one. What 
we want the density function to describe instead, is the entire population 
of customers to be served (or excluded) by the firm. Thus, by multiply­
ing the density by the number of people, we actually find the proportion 
of customers whose reservation price makes them choose the high quality 
service.
As before, equation (2.8) is numerically solvable from 
= (Nh +N l ) = N -  C g ( t ) d t  
* £  i i { N ~
As long as Assumption 3 holds, we do not need to compute it ami we can 
focus our attention on the optimal price gap.
Under assumptions 1. 2 and 4bis we can show that
Proposition 4.2. When T ~  r(r,£), the transcendental implicit func­
tion to be numerically solved for Ap is
ï W - j o -
A p -----------------------— 7 — —-------  =  0.
(Ap -  Ad) Sp-Sg -— ---------— e «■»*
A ir
Equation (??) is derived in Appendix B.
(4.5)
4.2. Results
Appendix C shows the results of the numerical simulation.2 According to 
the results, we can state the following.






























































































Observation 1: Ap increases with A a and A 3.
The optimal gap l>etween prices is the greater the higher the distance 
between fixed parameters which transform the taste for the good into 
reservation prices for the two qualities. This result affects the response of 
T\ to A a  and A 3  which is not as simple as in (2.5a), because A p varies 
with Ac* and A3. The optimal T\ still decreases with Aa. but much slower 
than in (2.5a). Unlike in (2.5a), T) increases with A3. Consequently, the 
number of high quality service units increases with A a and A3■
Observation 2: T\ is always lower than p
Another general result is the relation between T\ and the average 
value of the taste parameter p. When tastes are symmetrically dist ribut ed 
around the mean, the revenue maximizing Tjis such that more than half 
of the population of people with positive taste for the good are induced 
to buy the H good. It should be remembered that 7) is the lowest cut off 
point dividing H from L buyers.
The observed relation between 7j and p has an important implica­
tion. In the setting we have outlined, a seller facing a normally distributed 
g(t) can avoid the derivation of the first order condition when 7 N <  p. 
The simple solution
is optimal, and the gap between prices can be derived accordingly. 
Observation 3: The greater A/3, the more A'(/ increases with Aa. 
Observation 4: The greater p the less Nh increases with A a.
This result helps us seeing that results arc? not only related to the 
variance of consumers’ tastes (as R-R note), but also to the mean of them. 
If tastes are normally distributed, a higher mean lowers A p and Nh dimin­
ishes consequently. Therefore, if the taste parameter is higher on average, 
revenues are maximised by selling a smaller amount of H service units.
Observation 5: V A a, A p and I\ are the greater the greater A 3  and p.




























































































- r ~ r ( r , o .
Observation 7: Ap and 7) increase with A'// decreases with
Keeping r constant, the optimal price gap increases with £. A higher 
£ implies a lower mode of the distribution, a lower mean (because E[T) =  
|) and a greater area under the right part of the distribution. Thus, the 
higher the number of people with a high intensity of demand the larger the 
price gap. Expectedly, the firm can exploit the higher number of H-type 
potential buyers by enlarging Ap.
Observation 8: Vr, there is a £ : T\ >  |,
where * is the mean of the T distribution function.
Observation 9: Ap increases with r.
The last two observations should be compared with those involving 
p in the case of normally distributed tastes: a change in one of the two 
parameters of the T distribution function implies a change in the mean 
of the distribution. On the other hand, the interpretation of the two dis­
tribution functions’ response to their parameters is not the same to our 
purpose. A higher p means that, on average, people have a higher inten­
sity of demand. A higher r (keeping £ constant) lowers the skewness of t he 
distribution and, thus, not only implies that the average individual has 
a higher intensity of demand (as in the previous case) but also that the 
number of people with intensity of demand lower than the mean decreses. 
In the case of non-symmetrically distributed tastes, T\ is lower or higher 
than the mean of the distribution of tastes according to the other para­
meters’ values.
Observation 10: Ap increases with A a and A3.
This is about the behavior of the optimal Ap with respect to the 
differences between the parameters transforming the intensity of demand 
into reservation prices for the two qualities. Note that the skewed distrib­
ution of tastes does not alter the response of Ap to A a and A 3  observed 
for a symmetric distribution of tastes.
Observation 6: V A3  , Ap is the greater the greater A a and p. V Ad,




























































































Like in the case of normally distributed tastes, the optimal T\ de­
creases with A a (but not linearly as in (2.5a)). Still, unlike in (2.5a)). 
T\ increases with A 3  because the increase in Ap caused by an increase in 
A 3  more than compensate the lowering on 7) from a higher A 3  we would 
expect by (2.5a).
Observation 11: T\ decreases with Aa, and increases with A.I.
5. Optimal capacity
In the R-R model, the first order conditions in (2.7) and (2.8) hold with 
inequality (equality) if the capacity constraints are binding (not binding). 
If capacity is exogenously given, the revenue maximising firm compares t he 
capacity available with the maximum number of customers ready to buy 
the high quality service. At the beginning of the last section we defined 
the capacity as 7N, where 7 (0 < 7 < 1 ) is the proportion of potential 
buyers (N) which can be served by the available H type service units and 
(1 — 7 ) is the residual capacity of L type service units. The firm’s problem 
is now to compare j N  with A'H. If the optimal minimum Ap implies an 
Nh greater than 7IV, Ap has to be increased to ration H type customers.
Later in their analysis, R-R relax the exogeneity of capacity and 
derive conditions for profit maximising capacity. In this case, capacity 
costs are obviously not fixed and a profit function (instead of a revenue 
function) has to be maximised, since the seller’s problem is to reconfigure 
the available capacity and in doing so positive marginal capacity costs 
enter the analysis.
The aim of this section is to find the socially optimal capacity, 
namely the capacity which maximises consumers’ surplus. Our problem 
is now to find the socially optimal gap between prices of low and high 
quality service such that capacity is optimal.
Before answering this question, consider the analogy between this 
problem and that of peak load pricing of non-storable commodities whose 




























































































Firstly, we are considering pricing problems related to services (like the­
atre performances, transport facilities and also, as we will observe later, 
educational activities, schools, and health care services). Services are, by 
definition, non storable. Secondly, off-peak and on-peak demands can l>e 
interpreted as demands for ranked varieties of a service, namely demands 
for services offered at different qualities. Thirdly, as long as tastes are 
known, demand fluctuations over time are certain and not random. The 
last and more delicate point is why we choose to associate the analysis of 
demand for different qualities to that of intertemporal instead of spatial 
demand fluctuations. In a spatial framework, capacity has to Ire equal to 
aggregate demand. When demands differ over time, however, it is suffi­
cient that the capacity is adjusted to peak demand, as the higher capacity 
will be adequate to satisfy off-peak demand. Consider the following ex­
ample. Think of a school where students have the choice of applying for 
the base number of schooling hours only, or for more hours including addi­
tional activities (sports, language courses, etc.) or services (e.g. a school 
bus). Demand for schooling hours is the same for everybody, whereas the 
price for the ’’ advanced package” determines the gap between low and high 
demanders.
Let c and (c+ T ) lie the marginal costs for L and H , and let them lie 
constant, for simplicity. The unconstrained optimum would require prices 
for the two qualities to be equal to the corresponding marginal costs, 
and the gap between prices should be equal to T. Optimal corresponding 
capacity would be determined by pw =  (c +  T), and total costs would be 
covered by definition.
This solution can continue to hold when the demand for low quality 
is small relative to the demand for high quality but, when the opposite 
is true, total capacity costs cannot be recovered. (Phlips, 1983, Steiner, 
1957)
’’ Demand for the two qualities combined can be satisfied at a cost 
2c per combined unit up to the capacity limit, and (2c +  T) per combined 
unit beyond that limit” (Phlips, pg 139).3 Demands have then to be





























































































vertically added: the vertical sum compared with (2c + T) gives the point 
at which customers are ready to pay for the combined unit of both low 
and high quality.
Demands are those in equation (2.6). Vertical sum of the two. re­
sulting from pi +  Ap, is to be compared with (2c +  T) in order to find the 
G (To) which determines the optimal capacity. To can only be calculated 
from a given distribution of tastes g(t). Optimal Ap will be such that 
h'n =  Ni  , i.e. such that
/  9(t)dt=  /  g(t)dt. (5.1)
Jt0 Jt,
6. Further comments and concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied the sensitivity of the revenue maximising gap 
between two varieties of a private good to the distribution of consumers' 
tastes for the two qualities. Unlike the settings where customers are ex 
ante divided into homogeneous groups (and where each group has the same 
reservation price for the two qualities),.we have considered a case in which 
all customers agree on the ranking of qualities, but their reservation prices 
for the two qualities are different. We have focused on the fact that the 
model by Rosen and Rosenfield has not a general analytical solution for 
the gap between the two qualities’ prices. Therefore, we have derived two 
numerically solvable expressions for it. The numerical solutions helped us 
to identify the regularities of the model’s solutions and the responsiveness 
of the variables to the parameters beyond the analytical appearance, as 
in the case of the sensitivity of 1\ to changes in A  id.
One of the reasons why we have found this exercise interesting is 
the potential of the analysed model to be re-interpreted as referred to a 
distribution of income. The replacement of the dist ribut ion of tastes wit h 
an income distribution implies a different interpretation of A o and A/?. 
Reservation prices become a linear transformation of )>ersonal income, and 
A 3  can be interpreted as the proportion of income that people are ready to 
devote to the different qualities of a good or a service. To give an example, 




























































































or her income on a higher quality medical assistance. This modification 
in the interpretation is sufficient to reinterpret our results as referred to 
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7. Appendix A : tastes are normally distributed
N- ( j o ^  «I'M»)
Define
• x  =  Ap
• u fit  =  Au =  -L x _  4a _  t ,
• ! /  W  A/? a  a x  a p  J >
.  ;  =  £â
•
so that we can reformulate (7.1)as
»(*)
A -  /  g (2) d2
X = ----------= n ----------- (7.2)
K ( x )
- A  /  » (--> *
0
where the lower and upper bounds of the integral has been changed from
f z(t  =  o) =  - 5
Ap-AnN ( (  Ap- Aa't 1
l ~ v  [A )  H
Equation (7.2) is then
y v -
K ^ M i
I  9{z)<Lz
K ^ M i
l  I  9 ( : )dz




























































































Simplify the denominator of the second term of the last equation as
o o o
since the first integral does not depend on x.
(7









erf[tn] =  —= f exp(sJ)ds. (7.5)
V 7r Jo
For this function the derivatives are
erfM  =  ( ~ i r ^ H n( w ) e ^  (7.6)
with n =  1,2,.. and H„ is the Hermite polynomial. The first deriv­
ative of the error function is
fj JOS 1 9 9
d r rfH  *  =  ( - D ^ W e - ”1 =  £ « -
since Ho(w) =  1 .
By expressing the denominator of (7.4) as an error function, we 
can easily get its derivative. In doing so, we have to rememlrer that we 
changed variables from J^T) g(t)dl to f " iz,g(z)dz. Let s =  ^  (so that 































































































— 7= /  e x p ( - s 2)ds<*\A Jo




- ± = e M -\z')dz  with ±  erf y_
v̂ J
we see that what we have to solve is
(7.7)
(7.8)
Write (7.8) a s £ ^  ( i ) « r f& (* ) /v ^ ]^ .
5=[(iS-SS)-#‘] / » *






8. Appendix B: tastes are distributed as in a T distrl 
but ion
The system we have now to solve is
Ap =
</(0 =
( Ap- Ao \Jo AJ 9(t)dt)






























































































The Gamma distribution is a continuous random variable defined 
over the positive interval [0, +oo]. The distribution function is
1 T-l «
r(T )r
Substituting the expression of the T function we have
1 T _ i  - *
( f ~ Xr - , e -Zdx)(' X C ■ 
When r 6 Z+, it becomes
x ‘ e <
( r - l ) i r
Solving the system (8.1) out for Ap we find
A p -
APrA° , *
N -  L Aa - dxn  l o ______r(r)(r ux
-2 -  rosp Jo r(Tgr 








A p -A a  Ad
r(T)r
/  A p -  A a  \ T *
1 h \ a S ~ )
r ( r ) C A 0  h


































































































where the underlined ratio in the second row above derives from
A p + h  A q    A p - A q   h
A 3  A 3  ~  A 3 ‘




1 (A p -A a )  
r(r)er A 3 r
T(tKA d i
A > - A a  '
Since we are interesting in having 
get
Jo *e <dx =  N we
A p -
=  A p ­
r s - J o n r ) c dx * N
J ___(A p  - A q ) t ~
r(T)r A 3 r
r(r)r-/o ■
( A p - A q ) t ~




































































































9 A ppendix C
This Appendix reports parts of the results of the numerical simulations. In each table 
the optimal price gap, the threshold T\ (7T in the tables) and the portion of custom- 
choosing the lower quality are indicated for each value of the changing parameters, l’ a 
rameters kept constant are given in the first row o f the tables. The first column contains 
the parameter under scrutiny. The indexes ‘ . i ’ (i= l,2 ,3 .) at the third row have been 
added in order to make information as compact as possible. Results obtained with the 
normal distribution o f tastes can be found from Table 1 to Table 13. Tables 14 to 17 are 
referred to the gamma distribution of tastes.
Table 1
M=2 0=0.5
-------------- 1-------------05 4 M A£=l 5
ha Ap_1 n  1 3(T1)_1 Ap.2 T1_2 G(T1}_2 Up 3 T 1_3 |G(T1).3
02 0910 1.420 0 123 1.638 1 438 Ó 131 ] 2.367 1 4447 0 1 33
02267 0.934 1.415 0 121 1.662 1 4354 0 129 2 391 1 4429 0 133
02533 0959 1.411 0.119 1 686 1 4329 0 128 2 415 14411 0132
028 0983 1.406 0 117 1.710 1.4304 0.127 2.439 1 4393 0 131
0.3067 1.008 1 402 0 116 1.735 1 4279 0 126 2.4631 1 4376 0 130
03333 1 032 1 398 0.114 1.759 1.4255 0.125 2.4871 1.4359 0 130
0.36 1.057 1.394 0113 1783 14231 0 124 25112 1 4341 0129
0 3867 1 082 1 390 0.111 1 807 1.4207 0123 2.5354 1 4325! 0.128
0.4133 1.106 1 386 0 110 1832 1.4184 0 122 2.5595 1.4308] 0 127
0.44 1.131 1 382 0 108 1 856 1.4161 0 121 2 5837 1 4291 0 127
04667 1 156 1.378 0 107 1 881 1.4138 0 121 26079 1 4275] 0 126
0 4933 1.181 1 375 0 106 1 905 1.4116 0120 26322 1 4259] 0 125
052 1.206 1.371 0 104 1 929 1.4093 0 119 2 6564 1 4243, 0 125
05467 1231 1 368 0 103 1 954 1 4071 0 118 2.6807 1 4227 0124
05733 1256 1 365 0 102 1 978 1.405 0 117 2.7Ó5 142 l i t  0 123
06 1.281 1.361 0 101 2 002 1 4029 0 116 2 7293 1 419s] Ò 123
0 6267 1 306 1358 0.100 2 027 1.4007 0 115] 2 7536 1 4179 0 122
0 6533 1.331 1 355 0 098 2052 1.3987 0 1 is! 2 778 1 416s| 0 122
068 1.356 1 352 0 097 2077 1 3966 0 114| 2 80241 1 4149] 0 121
0 7067 1 381 1 349 0096 2 101 1 3946 0 113] 2 8268 1.4134] 0120
0 7332 1 406 1 346 0095 2 126 1 3926 0 112 28512 14119 0 120
076 1.431 1 343 0094 2 151 1 3906 O l i i ]  2 8757 1 4105 0 119
0.7867 1 457 1 340 0093 2 175 1.3887] 0 111] 29001 1 4089 0 119
0 8132 1 482 1 337 0 092 2200 1 3868 0 110 2 9246 Ì 40751 0 118
084
08667
1.507 1.334 0 091 2225 1 3849J 0 109| 2 9491 Ì 4061] 0 117
1 532 1 33 0 091 2 250 1 38291 0 109 1 29736 1 4046! 0 117
0 8933 1 558 1 329 . 0 090 ; 2.2741 1 38111 0 100' 2 9982 14033] 0 lie
0 92 1 583 1 326' 0089- 2.2991 1.3793] 0 107] 30227; 1 4018 0 116
09467 
0 9733
1 609 Ì .324] 0 008] 2.3241 1.3774] 0.ÌÓ7I 3Ò473] 1 40041 0 115





























































































Afi=l 0 =0 .3
M .5 ,1. 2.2 M= 2 8
Aa Ap_1 T 1_1 B (T 1) J Ap_2 T 1_2 G (T !> -2 Ap 3 T 1_3
0 .1 0 50 .2 1 .1 9 6 0 9 9 6 0 .1 5 7 1 8 2 0 1 6 2 0 0  123 2 .3 7 4 2 .174
0 2 2 6 7 1 .2 1 9 0 .9 9 2 0 1 5 5 1.844 1 .617 0  122 2 .3 9 9 2  172 0  105
0 .2 5 3 3 1 2 4 2 0  9 8 9 0 .1 5 3 1 8 6 8 1 .615 0  121 2 4 2 4 2 .1 7 0 0  104
0 2 8 1 .2 6 5 0 .9 8 5 0 1 5 2 1 8 9 3 1 .613 0  120 2  4 4 9 2 .1 6 9 0 .1 0 3
Ò.3067 1 2 8 9 0 9 8 2 0 .1 5 0 1 .9 1 7 1 .6 1 0 0  119 2 .4 7 4 2 .1 6 7 0  103
0 3 3 3 3 1 .3 1 2 0 .9 7 9 0 .1 4 9 1 .9 4 2 1 608 0 .118 2 4 9 9 2 .1 6 5 0  102
0 .3 6 1 .3 3 5 0 9 7 5 0 .1 4 7 1 .966 1 6 0 6 0  117 2 5 2 4 2 .1 6 4 0 .1 0 2
0 3 8 6 7 1 .359 0 .9 7 2 0 .1 4 6 1.991 1 604 0 .1 1 7 2  5 4 9 2 .1 6 2 0 1 0 1
0 .4 1 3 3 1-382 0 9 6 9 0 .1 4 4 2 .0 1 5 1 .602 0 .1 1 6 2 5 7 4 2 .1 6 0 0 .1 0 0
0 4 4 1 4 0 6 0 9 6 6 0 .1 4 3 2 .0 4 0 1 .6 0 0 0 1 1 5 2 5 9 9 2 .1 5 9 0 .1 0 0
0  4 667 1 4 3 0 0 9 6 3 0 .141 2 .0 6 4 1 5 9 8 0  114 2 .6 2 4 2 .1 5 7 0  0 9 9
0 4 9 3 3 1 .4 5 3 0  9 6 0 0 .1 4 0 2 .0 8 9 1 .5 9 6 0 1 1 3 2 6 4 9 2 .1 5 6 0 .0 9 9
0 .5 2 1 .4 7 7 0 .9 5 7 0 1 3 9 2  114 1 694 0 .1 1 3 2 6 7 4 2 1 5 4 0 .098
0 .5 4 6 7 1.501 0 9 5 4 0 .1 3 8 2 .1 3 8 1 5 9 2 0 .1 1 2 2 .6 9 9 2 .1 5 2 0 .098
0 .5 7 3 3 1 .5 2 5 0 6 5 2 0 .1 3 6 2 .1 6 3 1 .590 0 .111 2 .7 2 4 2 .151 0 0 9 7
0 .6 1 5 4 9 0 .9 4 9 0 .1 3 5 2 .1 8 8 1 5 8 8 0 .1 1 0 2 .7 4 9 2 .1 4 9 0 0 9 7
0  6267 1 .5 7 3 0 .9 4 6 0 .1 3 4 2 .2 1 3 1 5 8 6 0 .1 1 0 2 .7 7 5 2 .1 4 8 0  0 9 6
0  6533 1 .5 9 7 0 .9 4 3 0 .1 3 3 2 .2 3 7 1.584 0 1 0 9 2 .8 0 0 2 .1 4 6 0 .0 9 6
0 6 8 1.621 0 .941 0  132 . 2 .2 6 2 1 5 8 2 0 .1 0 8 2 .8 2 S 2 .1 4 5 0 0 9 5
0 7 0 6 7 1 6 4 5 0 .9 3 8 0 .1 3 0 2 .2 8 7 1 .580 0 .1 0 8 2 8 5 0 2 .1 4 3 0  0 9 5
0 .7 3 3 3 1 6 6 9 0 .9 3 5 0 .1 2 9 2 .3 1 2 1 5 7 8 0 1 0 7 2 .8 7 5 2  142 0 0 9 4
0 .7 6 1 .6 9 3 0 9 3 3 0 .1 2 8 2 .3 3 7 1 5 7 7 0  106 2  901 2  141 0 0 9 4
0 .7 8 6 7 1 .7 1 7 0 .9 3 0 0 .1 2 7 2.361 1 5 7 5 0 1 0 6 2 .9 2 6 2  139 0  0 9 3
0 .8 1 3 3 1.741 0 9 2 8 0  126 2 .3 8 6 1 .5 7 3 0 1 0 5 2 9 5 1 2  138 0 0 9 3
0 .8 4 1 7 6 5 0 9 2 5 0 .1 2 5 2  411 1.571 0 1 0 4 2 .9 7 6 2 .1 3 6 0 .0 9 2
0 .8 6 6 7 1 .7 9 0 0 9 2 3 0 1 2 4 2 4 3 6 1 .5 7 0 0 .1 0 4 3 0 0 2 2  135 0 0 9 2
0 8 9 3 3 1 .814 0 9 2 1 0  123 2.461 1 5 6 8 0  103 3  0 2 7 2  134 0 0 9 1
0 .9 2 1 8 3 8 0 9 1 8 0  122 2 4 8 6 1 5 6 6 0  102 3 0 5 2 2  132 0.091
0  9467 1 8 6 3 0 9 1 6 0 .121 2 5 1 1 1 564 0  102 3 0 7 8 2.131











































































































o 0 5 
G (71 ) :
0 216  1.210 0994  





1 834 j 1.618* 0 203 
1 849 1.6171 0.202
0 797 2 389 2 173 0  585: 
0 798' 2 404 2 1 72 - 0 185 
”  .0.790 : 2 .4 Ì9 - 2.171 ! 0 184! 
’ Ò799! “ 2.434" 2 170' 0 184'
0 248 1.237 0.989 0233 0 767 18631 1.6151 0 202
0.264 1.251 0.987 0232 0 768 1 878] 1.614| 0.201
0.28 1.265 0 985 0231 0 769 1 893) 1.613: 0 201 0 799 2449 2 169  ̂ 0 184 
2464 27l6B* ~ 0.183:0 296 1.279 0 983 0230 0 770 Ì  .9071 1.6111 0.200 0 800
0.312 1.293 0.981 0229 0 771 1.922 j 1610 0 200 0800 2 479 2 167* 0 1831
0.328 1 307 0.979 0228 0 772 1.937 1.609 0 199 0 801 2 494 2 1 66 0 182' 
Ò 182; 
O Ì82 '
0344 1.321 0 977 0 228 0 772 1 9511 1.607 0.199 0801 2509 2 165
0 36 1.335 0 975 0 227 0773 1 966' 1606 0.198! 0 802 2 524 2 164
0.376 1.350 0 974 0226 0774 1.981 1.605 0.198 0 802 2.539 2 163, 0 181!
0.392 1.364 0 972 0 225 0775 1.996 1.604 0.197 0  803 2 554: 2 162 Ò 181! 
ò l é ì i0408 1.378 0970 0.224 0.776 2010 1.602 0.197 0  603 2 569 2 161
0.424 1.392 0 968I 0224 0776 2 025 1601 0196 0804 2 584 2 160 0 .180!
ò.iéòj0.44 1.406 0.966 0223 0.777 2040 1.600 0 196 0 804 2 599 2 159
0.456 1.420 0 964 0222 0.778 2 055 1 599 0 195 0 805 2 614 ! 2158 0  179J 
O Ì790 472 1 434 0.962 0 221 0779 2.069 1.597 0195 0 805 2 629! 2.157
0 488 1.449 0 961 0 220 0.780 2 084 1.596 0.194 0 806 2 644 ! 2.156 0  179! 
6X7810.504 1.463 0.959 0220 0780 2099 1.595 0 194 0806 2 6591 2.155
0.52 1.477 0.957 0519 0781 2.114 1.594 0 193 0 807 2674] 2154 0  Ì78
0.536 1.491 0 955 0.218 0782 2.128 1.592 0 193 0 807 2 68§7 2153 Ò. 178
0.552 1 506 0 954 0218 0782 2 143 1 591 0 192 0 808 2 704 , 2 1 52 ! 0 177Ì
0 568 1 520 0 952 0.217 0783 2 1 58 1.590 0 192 0 808 2719 2 151 Ò 1771 
0  177!0 584 1 534 0 950 0 216 0784 2.173 1 589 0.191 0 809 2 734 2 15Ó
0 6 1.549 0 949 0215 0785 2 188 1 588 0 191 0 809 2.749' 2149: 0176 '
0616 1 563 0 947 0215 0785 2 203 1 587 0 190 0810 2.765; 2 149* 0  176!
0 632 1.577 0 945 0 214 0786 2217 1.585 0 190 0 8 Ì0 2 780, 2.1407 0  176'
1583
1.5827'





































































































































P- 2 . . .  . . . . .  J
a=0 6 a -0 .7
&a Ap_1 "  1 « f f . 'U . Ap. 2 T1_2 G(T 1) 2 ap ,.3 T 1_3 0(T1).3
0 2 1 677 / 1 4777 0  0958 1 638 1 438 0  1745 1 6386 1.4386 0  2113
0  2267 1 7025i 1 4758 0 0950 1 6621 1.4354 0  1734 1 661 1 4343 0 2095
0  2533 1.7274 1 4741 0 0943 1.6862 1.4329 0  1723 1 6834 1 4301 0 2078
0 2 8 1.7522 1.4722 ÒÓ935 1.7104 1.4304 0  1712 1.7058 1 4258 0  2060
0  3067 1.7771 Ì 4704 0 0928 1.7346 1.4279 0  1702 1.7284 1.4217 0  2044
0  3333 1 8021 1 4688 00921 1.7588 1.4255 0  1692 1 7509 1.4176 02027
0 3 6 1 827 1.467 0 0913 1.7831 1 4231 0 1682 1 7736 1.4136 0  2011
0 3667 1 852 1.4653 6 0907 1 8074 Ì.42Ó7 0 1671 1.7963 1 4096 0  1995
0  4133 1 877 1 4637 0 0900 1 8317 1 4184 0 1662 1 819 1.4057 0.1979
0  44 1.902 1.462 0 0893 1 8561 1 4161 Ò 1652 1 8418 1 4018 0.1964
6  4933 1.9521 1 Ì 5 8 8 0 0880 1.9049 1 4116 0  1634 ì  8876 ì  3943 0  1934
0 5 2 1 9772 1 4572 0 0874 1.9293 1 4093 0  1624 1.9105 ì  3905 0 1920
0  5467 2 0023 1.4556 0 0868 1 9538 ì 4071 0  1615 1 9335 1 3868 0 1905
0  5733 2 0274 1.4541 0 0862 1.9783 1.405 0  1607 1.9565 1.3832 0.1891
0 6 20525 1.4525 0 0855 2 0029 1 4029 6 1598 ^  1.9796 ì .37961 0.1877
0 6 2 6 7 20777 1 451 0  0850 2 0274 1.4007 0  1589 2 0028 1.3761 0  1864
0 6 5 3 3 2.1029 1 4496 0 0644 2 052 1.3987 01581 2 0259 1 3726 0  1851
0 6 8 2  1281 1 4481 0  0838 2 0766 Ì 3966 0 1 5 7 3 2 0492 ì 3692 0  1838
0 7 0 6 7 2 1533 I 4466 0 06331 2 1013 1 3946 0  15651 2 0 7 2 4 1.3657 0  1824
0  7333 2 1785 1.4452 0 0827 2 1259 1 3926 0 1557 2  0957 1.3624 0.1812
0.76 2 2038 1 4438 0  0822 2 1506 1 3906 0 1549 2 1191 1 3591 6 1799
0  7867 2 2 2 9 1 4423 0  0816 2.1754 1.3887 0  1541 2  1424 1.3557 0.1787
0 8 1 3 3 2 2543 1.441 0 0811 2 2001 1 3868 0 1 5 3 4 2 1659 1.3526 0.1775
0 8 4 2 2796 1 4396 0 0806 2 2249 1 3849 0  1526 2  1893 1 3493 0 1763
0 8 6 6 7 2 3049 1.4382 0 0801 22496 1 3829 0 1519 2 2 1 2 8 1 3461 0 1751
0 8 9 3 3 2 3303 1 <37 0 0796 22744 1.3811 0  1512 2 2363 1.343 0.1740
0 9 2 2 3 556 1.4356 0  0791 22993 1 3793 0.1505 2 2 5 9 9 1.3399 0.1728
0  9467 2 381 1 4343 0 0786 2 3241 1 3774 0 1497 2 2 8 3 5 ì  3368 0.1717





























































































o=0 5 M=2 1
Aa=0 5 Aa=l Aa= 1 5
. —
Ag 4 E J  . n _ i  iG fr i j  i Ap_2 Tl_2 G(T1),2 Ap 3 Ti _3 G(T 1) .3
0 5 1.187 1374: 0.105 1.659 2319 0.738 2.139 3 278 0995
05333 1.235 1 -3781 0 107 1.706 2262 0.700 2 186 3 161 0 990
05667 1.283 1.382 0 108 1 754 2212 0.664 2232 3 056 0983
0 6 1.331 1.385 0.109 1.801 2.168 0 632 2278 2 964 0973
06333 1.379 1.389 0.111 1348 2129 0 602 2325 2882 0.961
0.6667 1.428 1391 0.112 1 896 2.094 0.574 2372 2807 0 947
0.7 1.476 1.394 0 113 1.943 2.062 0549 2419 2 741 0 931
0.7333 1.524 1.397 0.114 1.991 2.033 0.527 2 466 2 680 0913
0.7667 1.572 1.399 0115 2 039 2.007 0 506 2513 2625 0894
0 8 1.621 1.401 0 115 2.087 1 983 0 487 2 560 2575 0875
0 8333 1.669 1.403 0.116 2134 1-961 0469 2 607 2528 0855
0 8667 1.717 1.405 0117 2182 1.941 0 453 2 654 2485 0834
0.9 1.766 1.406 0 118 2 230 1922 0 438 2 702 2 446 0814
0 9333 1.814 1.408 0.118 2278 1.905 0 425 2 749 2410 0 794
0 9667 1.863 1.410 0 119 2326 1.889 0412 2.796 2375 0774
1 1.911 1.411 0 119 2374 1874 0400 2 844 2 344 0754
1.0333 1.959 1.412 0.120 2 422 1.860 0 390 2 891 2314 0 735
1.0667 2006 1.414 0.120 2470 1847 0 380 2 939 2286 0717
1.1 2.056 1.415 0.121 2318 1835 0370 2987 2261 0 699
1.1333 2.105 1.416 0.121 2 566 1823 0  362 3 034 2.236 0682
1.1667 2.153 1.417 0 122 2614 1812 0 354 3 082 2213 0  665
1.2 2202 1 418 0122 2 662 1802 0 346 3 130 2.191 0 649
1.2333 2250 1.419 0.123 2711 1.792 0  339 3 178 2171 0634
1.2667 2299 1.420 0.123 2759 1.783 0 332 3 225 2.151 0619
1.3 2347 1.421 0.123 2 807 1.775 0326 3 273 2 133 0 605
1.3333 2 396 1.422 0.124 2 855 1.766 .0 3 2 0 3321 2116 0 592
1.3667 2444 1.423 0.124 2 903 1.759 0315 3 369 2 099 0 579
1.4 2.493 1.423 0.124 2 952 1.751 0 309 3 417 2 084 0.566
1.4333 2.541 1.424 0.125 3000 1.744 0304 3 465 2 069 0 554





























































































0=0.5 Aa=0 5 1 i
M=2 5 M-J.S
àS___ Ap_1 T1_1 G (T ')J Ap_2 T l 2 G(T1)_2 Ap_3 T1_3 G(T1) 3
0.5 1 4219 1.8438 00947 1.6593 23186 00665 1.8986 2.7972 00799
05333 1.4852 1.8474 0 0959 1.7382 23218 0 0675 1.9932 27999 0 0807
0 5667 1 5485 1.8502 0 0969 1 8171 2.3242 00682 2 0878 2.6018 0 0813
0 6 1.6119 1.8532 0.0979 1.8960 2 3267 0 0890 2.1824 2.8040 00820
06333 1.6753 1.8558 00988 1.9749 2 3289 0 0698 2 2770 2.8059 0 0825
0.6667 1.7387 1.8580 0 0996 2 0538 2.3306 0 0903 23717 28074 0.0830
0 7 1.8022 1.8603 0.1004 2.1328 23326 0.0910 24664 2 8091 0 0835
0.7333 1.8656 1.8623 0.1011 2-2117 2 3342 0 0915 2 5610 2.8106 0 0840
0.7667 1.9291 1.8640 0 1017 2 2907 23356 0.0920 26557 28117 0 0843
0 8 1.9926 1 8658 0 1023 2 3697 2.3371 00925 2.7504 2.8130 0.0647
08333 2 0561 1.8674 01029 2 4487 23385 0 0929 2 8451 2.8142 00851
08667 2.1197 1.8688 0.1034 2 5277 2 3396 0 0933 2.9398 2.8150 0 0854
0.9 2.1832 1.8702 0.1039 26067 2 3408 0 0937 3 0345 28161 0 0857
09333 22467 1.8715 01044 2 6857 23419 0 0941 3.1292 2.8171 0 0860
0 9667 2.3103 1.8727 0.1048 27648 23428 0 0944 3 2239 28177 0 0862
1 2.3739 1.8739 0.1052 2 8438 23438 0.0947 33187 2.8187 0 0865
1.0333 2.4374 1.8750 0  1056 2.9228 23447 00950 34134 2.8195 0 0868
1.0667 2.5010 1.8759 0 1060 30019 2.3455 0 0953 3 5081 2.8200 0 0869
1.1 2 5646 1.8769 0  1063 30809 2 3463 00955 3 6029 28208 0 0872
1.1333 2  6282 1.8779 0  1067 3 1600 2.3471 0 0958 3 6976 2 8215 00874
1.1667 26918 1 8786 0.1070 3.2390 2 3476 00960 37923 2 8219 00875
1.2 2.7554 1.8795 01073 33181 23484 00963 3 8871 2.8226 00877
1.2333 28190 1.8803 01076 3 3972 2 3491 0 0965 39818 28232 0 0879
1.2667 2 8826 1.8810 0 1078 3 4762 2 3496 0 0967 40766 2.8236 0.0880
1.3 2 9462 1.8817 0.1081 35553 23502 00969 4.1713 28241 0 0882
1.3333 3 0098 1.8824 Ò.1084 3 6344 2.3509 0 0971 42661 2 8246 0 0884
1.3667 3 0735 1.8830 0.1086 371341 2.3512 0.0972 4 3608 2.8249 0 0885
14 3.1371 1 8836 0 Ì088 3 7925 2 3518 0 0974 4 4556 28254 0 0886
1 4333! 3 2007 1.8843 0.1091 3 8716, 2 3523 00976 4.5504 28259 0.0888




























































































T b b le  7
Aa=0.5 M=3
o=06 o=08 0=1 1
Ap_1 T1_1 ap-2 T1_2 G(T1)_2 Ap 3 TI 3 G(T1)_3
0.2440.5 1 634 2.267 0.111 1 614 2.227 0.167 1 619 2239
05333 1.711 2271 0.112 1.691 2233 0 169 1.698 2246 0.247
05667 1.789 2.274 0113 1.769 2 239 0.171 1 777 2553 0.248
0.6 1 867 2.278 0.114 1 846 2244 0 172 1 855 2 259 0.250
06333 1.944 2.281 011 5 1924 2.248 0.174 1.934 2264 0252
0.6667 202 2 2283 0.116 2002 2252 0 175 2013 2269 0253
0.7 2.100 2286 0.117 2079 2256 0.176 2 092 2.274 0 255
0.7333 2.178 2288 0.118 2157 2260 0177 2 171 2278 0256
0.7667 2.256 2290 0.118 2235 2.263 0178 2249 2282 0 257
0 8 2.333 2292 0.119 2.313 2266 0 179 2328 2285 0258
0 8333 2.411 2293 0.119 2390 2 269 0.180 2407 2289 0 259
08667 2.489 229 5 0.120 2468 2271 0.181 2486 2.292 0 260
0.9 2567 2.296 0.120 2 546 2273 0.182 2565 2295 0261
0.9333 2 645 2296 0 121 2 624 2276 0183 2 644 2298 0562
09667 2.723 2299 0.121 2702 2278 0183 2 723 2300 0 262
1 2 800 2300 0.122 2.780 2280 0184 2 803 2 303 0263
1.0333 2.878 2302 0  122 2 858 2 282 0 185 2 882 2.305 0264
1.0667 2 956 2303 0.123 2 935 2 283 0185 2961 2 307 0264
1.1 3034 2304 0.123 3013 2285 0.186 3 040 2.309 0 265
1.1333 3.112 2.305 0.123 3.091 2287 0.186 3 119 2 311 0 265
1.1667 3.190 2.306 0.124 3 169 2288 0 187 3 198 2313 0 266
1.2 3 268 2.307 0.124 3247 2.289 0.187 3277 2314 0567
1.2333 3.346 2.307 0.124 3 325 2.291 0.188 3 356 2316 0267
1.2667 3.424 2306 0  124 3403 2.292 0  188 3435 2317 0 267
1.3 3502 2.309 0  125 3481 2 293 0 188 3515 2 319 0 268
1.3333 3580 2310 0 125 3559 2 294 0 189 3594 2 320 0268
1.3667 3 658 2310 0 125 3637 2.295 0 189 3673 2322 0 269
1.4 3.735 2 311 0 125 3715 2296 0190 3752 2 323 0 269 
0 2691 4333 3.813 2.312 0.126 3793 2297 0.190 3 831 2 324
1 4667 3891 2.312 0.126 3871 2 298 0 190 3910 2 325 0 270






























































































Aa=0 5 A a*l Aa=l 5
i l Ap_1 T I 1 G(T1)_1 Ap_ 2 TI 2 G(T1) 2 Ap 3 T I 3 G(T 1 )_3
15 1 459 0959 0.140 1.912 0912 0 120 2 374 0 874 0 105
1 5333 1 409 0989 0.138 1.942 0942 0 118 2405 0.905 0 105
1.5667 1.519 1 019 0.136 1.973 097 3 0 117 2.437 0937 0 104
16 1.548 1 048 0135 2.003 1.003 0 116 2468 0 968 0 103
1 6333 1 578 1.078 0133 2034 1.034 0.115 2499 0999 0.102
1 6667 1 608 1.108 0.132 2.065 1 065 0114 2.530 1030 0 101
1.7 1 638 1.138 0131 2.095 1.095 0113 2 561 1 061 0 101
1 7333 1 668 1.168 0.129 2.126 1.126 0112 2593 1.093 0.100
1.7667 1.696 1 198 0.128 2.157 1.157 0.111 2.624 1.124 0 099 _
1 8333 1 759 1 259 0125 2219 1219 0 109 2 687 1.187 0098
1.8667 1.789 1289 0.124 2250 1250 0109 2.718 1-218 0.097
1.8 1.820 1.320 0.123 2281 1281 0 108 2 749 1.249 0 097
1.9333 1.850 1.350 0.122 2.312 1212 0107 2.781 1281 0096
1.9667! 1.881 1.381 0.121 2.343 1.343 0.106 2812 1.312 0095
2 1.911 1.411 0.119 2.374 1.374 0.105 2.844 1344 0095
2.0333 1.642 1.442 0.118 2.405 1.405 0.104 2875 1375 0 094
2.0667! 1.972 1.472 0.117 2.436 1.436 0.104 2.907 1.407 0 093
2.1 2.003 1.503 0.116 2467 1 467 0.103 2.938 1.438 0 093
2.1333 2 034 1.534 0.115 2  499 1.499 0102 2.970 1.470 0 092
2.1667 2 064 1.564 0.114 2.530 1.530 0.101 3002 1.502 0 092
2.2 2 095 1.595 0.113 2.561 1.561 0 101 3033 1.533 0 091
22333 2.126 1.626 0.112 2.592 1.592 0.100 3065 1.565 0 091
22667 2.157 1 657 O l i i 2.624 1.624 0099 3 097 1.597 0090
2.3 2.188 1.688 0110 2655 1.655 0099 3.128 1.628 0090
2 3333 2219 1.719 0.109 2.687 1.687 0 098 3 160 1 660 0089
2 3667 2.250 1 750 0 109 2.718 1.718 0 097 3 192 1 692 0088
2.4 2 281 1.781 0 108 2749 1.749 0 097 3223 1.723 0088
24667 2 343 1 843 0106 2812 1.812 0095 3287 1 787 0087






























































































A6=05 A M ) 8 AfUl-S
. - F ...... ap_t TI 1 G (T1)-’ Ap 2 T l 2 G(T1L2 Ap 3 T l 3 G(T1)_3
1.5 1 4222 0844 0 095 1.7135 0.892 0112 24128 0942 0.132
1.5333 1.4379 0876 0094 1.7382 0923 0111 24577 0972 0.131
1.5667 1.4536 0907 0094 1.7628 0954 0 110 2 5027 1.002 0.129
1.6 1.4693 0939 0 093 1.7875 0984 0 109 2 5479 1.032 0 128
1.6333 1.4851 0.970 0.092 1.8123 1.015 0 108 25931 1 062 0.127
1.6667 1.5009 1.002 0 092 1.8371 1 046 •0107 2 6385 1.092 0.125
1.7 1.5167 1.033 0  091 1.8619 1.077 0.107 26839 1.123 0.124
1.7333 1.5325 1.065 0  091 1.8867 1.108 0.106 27294 1 153 0 123
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